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Introduction
Mental imagery is reportedly one of the commonest things people remember 
about their narrative reading in the long term (Sadoski et al.), and it correlates with 
various other dimensions of reader response, most notably with emotion (Krasny 
and Sadoski).
The objective of this article is twofold. In the first part, I will discuss two 
issues central to any theoretical inquiry into mental imagery: embodiment and 
consciousness. I will do so against the backdrop of second‑generation cognitive 
science—more specifically, the increasingly popular research framework of 
embodied cognition—and I will consider two caveats attached to its current 
exploitation in narrative theory. In the second part, I will attempt to cast new light 
on readerly mental imagery by offering a typology of what I propose to be its four 
basic varieties. The typology is grounded in the framework of embodied cognition, 
and it is largely compatible with key neuroscientific and other experimental evidence 
produced within the framework. It is, however, primarily based on introspection, 
the one tool available to me for accessing conscious experience. Even though 
individual predispositions towards imagery (e.g. the tendency to image more or 
less often, more or less vividly, in greater or lesser detail, or within specific sensory 
modalities) are known to differ significantly, the proposed varieties are meant to 
capture imagery structures operating, in full or in part, across these differences. 
The notion of mental imagery is used in its narrow sense here so as to capture 
those instances in which modern silent readers of literary narrative, while reading 
an expression “X,” experience some form of sensory representation of what 
they (more or less literally) understand to be X.1 Despite individual variations in 
susceptibility to mental imagery, all readers experience mental images some of the 
time, and some readers experience them all the time (see also Sadoski and Paivio 
74). Such experiences can be grounded in any sensory modality, deploying the 
external senses—i.e., the visual (sight), the auditory (hearing), the olfactory (smell), 
the gustatory (taste), and the tactile (touch)—as well as the internal senses—i.e., 
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the interoceptive (pain, hunger, etc.), the proprioceptive (balance, limb and organ 
position, etc.), or the motor/kinesthetic (movement‑related proprioception: effort, 
acceleration, etc.). They can, and very often do, combine several of these modalities.
Extant theoretical literature on mental imagery thus defined is small but 
thematically and methodologically diverse. Authors tend to focus on highly specific 
questions such as those concerning the art of composing imageable face or flower 
descriptions, respectively (Jajdelska et al.; Scarry), or the links between spatial 
imagery and readers’ childhood memories (Burke). As a consequence, this article is 
probably the first attempt to categorize readerly mental imagery in the most general 
of terms, as a set of distinct embodied experiences, each with a unique combination 
of essential properties. However, as literary scholarship is more and more accepting 
of crossovers into cognitive science, the theoretical literature accounting for mental 
imagery keeps growing steadily. The contemporary second generation of cognitive 
science, and especially the framework of embodied cognition, can indeed be very 
helpful to advancing our understanding of mental imagery and other lower‑order 
(e.g. affective) aspects of reader response. Perhaps most notably, narrative scholars 
have begun to explore what goes under the name of embodied simulation (for a 
review, see Caracciolo, “Embodiment at the Crossroads”).
Embodied simulation stands for several interrelated cognitive phenomena 
that are currently being unraveled with the help of fMRI and other experimental 
methodologies and that are perhaps most notoriously represented by (but not 
restricted to) mirror neurons. Briefly put, it has been suggested that in the processing 
of language referring to sensorimotor contents, whether it is an isolated phrase 
such as “grab the cake” (Raposo et al.) or a full‑fledged narrative (Speer et al.), our 
sensorimotor cortex becomes automatically activated in much the same way as if 
we were acting out the represented actions and perceptions ourselves. For instance, 
when a story protagonist is reported to pick up an object, e.g., a textbook, this is 
reflected not only in the motor but also in the visual area of the brain that would 
be active if the reader actually picked up the same object.
Nevertheless, the exploitation of embodied simulation in literary and other 
theory is not wholly unproblematic. In each attempt at fusing literary theoretical 
speculation with experimental cognitive science, one could identify a host of 
methodological problems, starting from the fact that the stimuli used in cognitive 
experiments usually do not bear the slightest resemblance to literary narrative. I have 
chosen to accept most of these problems as a natural part of any interdisciplinary 
inquiry. However, there are two caveats that I would like to mention: I will call 
them “the problem of referential bias” and “the problem of consciousness.”
Literary Narrative and Mental Imagery: A View from Embodied Cognition 277
1. The Tenets (and Caveats) of Embodied Cognition
1.1 Referential Bias
As much as one should be impressed by the fact that the nonverbal, referential 
contents of narrative literature can be traced in one’s sensorimotor cortex, or even 
musculature (for a review, see Fischer and Zwaan), there is evidence pointing 
toward embodied simulation of yet another kind: the verbal kind. That is, not only 
do we process sentences such as “He picked up his English workbook” (Speer et 
al. 991) in ways largely resembling the situations they refer to, but we also process 
them in ways largely resembling the activity of reading them out loud or listening 
to them as spoken by somebody else.
It has long been suggested that the speech apparatus and auditory circuitry 
are active during language comprehension, including silent reading, in a process 
known as subvocal rehearsal (Baddeley, Eldridge, and Lewis). More recently, 
studies have shown that listening to speech activates the recipient’s tongue muscles 
(Watkins, Strafella, and Paus); that verbal auditory imagery activates the auditory 
cortex (for a review, see Hubbard); and, crucially, that silent narrative reading 
activates the temporal voice areas associated with speech perception (Yao, Belin, 
and Scheepers). In other words, silent reading entails “voices” in one’s brain. The 
conclusion that narrative reading is a largely simulative and embodied process thus 
applies to the verbal medium as much as it applies to referential contents. From 
the viewpoint of narrative theory, traditionally studying the many different ways 
in which nonverbal phenomena (characters, events) can be verbally conveyed, this 
should make perfect sense. Yet, interestingly, verbal simulations have enjoyed far 
less popularity compared to their referential counterpart. In contemporary narrative 
theory, verbal simulations (and verbal imagery) are largely unnoticed (but see Tsur 
for an account of verbal imagery in poetry). This is what I mean by referential bias.
Referential bias may be a direct effect of the preceding decades of verbal 
hegemony epitomized in structuralist and poststructuralist thinking. Also, it coincides 
with a general tendency in cognitive science, including standard theories of mental 
imagery, to privilege referential over verbal images and, within the referential domain, 
to privilege the visual over other sensory modalities. One notable exception is the 
dual coding theory first proposed by Allan Paivio (Mental Representations) and 
later adapted for reading in collaboration with Mark Sadoski (Imagery and Text), 
an integrative theoretical project bridging the gap in cognitive science between the 
first and second generation. Sadoski and Paivio postulate two parallel cognitive 
systems, the nonverbal (in my nomenclature: the referential) and the verbal, each 
with a potential to yield sensorimotor effects during reading (e.g. a visual image of 
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a cup vs. the verbal auditory image /kup/). Although a major part of their imagery 
examples still belong to the referential domain and visual modality, other modalities 
and types of imagery are cited or at least recognized.
Fig. 1. Paivio’s general model of the dual coding theory (first published in 1986 as 
Figure 4.1 in his Mental Representations: A Dual Coding Approach, p. 67; reprinted 
by permission of Oxford UP, USA). Under this model, what I have termed readers’ 
referential imagery and simulation processes belong to the right‑hand system, while 
the left‑hand system accommodates imagery and simulation processes pertaining to 
the text as verbal stimulus.
1.2 Consciousness
Despite its undeniable qualities, even Sadoski and Paivio’s work seems to be 
(partly) implicated in the second caveat that needs to be mentioned at this point, 
i.e., the problem of consciousness. The problem arises whenever non‑conscious 
subpersonal processes on the one hand and conscious experience (i.e. processes at 
least partly noticeable to the subject herself) on the other are treated as if they were 
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the same thing. For instance, neuroscience research of the kind mentioned above 
is often cited, especially outside the home discipline, with so much enthusiasm 
that the non‑conscious processes central to this research—be they called “mental 
representation” as in first‑generation cognitive science, including Sadoski and Paivio, 
or “embodied simulation” as in the framework of embodied cognition—become 
more or less conflated with the notion of mental imagery.
This happened for instance when one of the very first fMRI studies of embodied 
simulation using entire connected narrative (a straightforward account of a boy’s 
day at school), conducted by Nicole Speer and colleagues, was publicly announced 
in a newspaper article titled “Readers Build Vivid Mental Simulations of Narrative 
Situations, Brain Scans Suggest” (Everding; my italics; see Ryan for further 
discussion). Obviously, the “vividness” ascribed in the article to the fMRI‑detected 
simulations is an experiential category, whereas cerebral blood flow is not. In a 
similar vein, literary scholar Hannah Chapelle Wojciehowski and neuroscientist 
Vittorio Gallese use the mirror neuron literature to support the conclusion that, “by 
means of the mirroring mechanisms,” literature “guides us into . . . imagined bodily 
experience” (Chapelle Wojciehowski and Gallese; my italics). Without denying the 
importance of fMRI or the mirror neuron literature, it should be acknowledged that 
few readers probably experience muscular activity and other vivid motor imagery 
every time they read about a boy picking up a textbook from a desk. If this were 
the case, the reading mind would be constantly overtaxed. To say that one’s brain 
runs a simulation of X is not to say that one necessarily experiences X or a mental 
image thereof. This distinction is not drawn often enough or explicitly enough. 
This is what I mean by the problem of consciousness.
Sadoski and Paivio are more careful than most other authors in both literary 
studies and cognitive science about drawing the line between non‑conscious and 
conscious processes, but they are still ambiguous on this point. In some places (e.g. 
Sadoski and Paivio 53) they define imagery as a conscious experience. However, 
they also seem to assume that the nonverbal (in my nomenclature: referential) 
imagery system is at work in all language comprehension, even when images are 
not expressly noticed by the comprehender (e.g. Sadoski and Paivio 74). This 
discrepancy may provoke questions: What exactly is a mental image if it is not 
consciously experienced? If we do not notice it, how do we know the contents 
are really there as an image, i.e., something to be directly perceived rather than 
decoded propositionally?
The small but growing field of empirical literary studies, unlike its ancestral 
disciplines literary theory and cognitive science, is mostly clear with regard to 
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the problem of consciousness because it deals with readers’ conscious self‑report 
(questionnaires, verbal protocols, class discussion recordings, etc.). But when mental 
imagery is brought up in this field at all, it is usually conceptualized as one of many 
dimensions on a scale devised to measure a more complex phenomenon, such as 
narrative transportation (Green)2 or perceived literariness (Miall and Kuiken). As a 
consequence, researchers rarely ask subjects to do more than simply report if and 
to what extent (on a scale from 1 to n) a given stimulus text calls up images in their 
mind. This tells the researchers little about what it is like, in terms of experience, 
to have these images and what they are really images of. Although the researchers 
need not worry about this in pursuit of their particular research objectives, their 
research thus entails a nested problem of consciousness in that it fails to account for 
the felt qualities of the reported imagery experience.3 What follows is a theoretical 
account of exactly those qualities. Its validity remains (to the extent that this is 
possible) to be empirically verified.
2. Varieties of Mental Imagery in Literary Narrative
What is it like to experience mental imagery while reading literary narrative, or 
rather, what are the basic varieties of this what‑it‑is‑likeness?
Generally, mental imagery in reading is subject to three factors (see also Esrock 
and Kuzmičová): the text (What kind of imagery does it invite?), the reader (What 
kind of imager is she?), and the situation (What way of reading does she happen 
to engage in at a given moment?). The text factor, i.e., the task of determining the 
imagery potential of discrete narrative strategies, is probably of most obvious interest 
to literary scholars. Some of my earlier work dealing with this factor is referenced 
in footnotes below. Meanwhile, this article makes but a few generic suggestions as 
to how the different imagery varieties may typically be cued in text. It focuses on 
exploring the experiential diversity of mental imagery per se. For this purpose, the 
proposed imagery varieties will all be exemplified with the same literary passage, 
and partly also the same sentence. This should demonstrate how the text factor 
operates in concert with the individual reader’s predispositions (the reader factor), 
as well as with the unique dynamics of a particular reading session (the situation 
factor). The four scenarios described below may be seen either as four different 
imagery experiences of four differently predisposed hypothetical readers or as four 
different hypothetical situations of a single reader‑imager (in this case, myself).
Until this point I have discussed two varieties of mental imagery: the referential 
and the verbal. The referential and the verbal may be understood as two values of a 
variable called the domain of imagery. If we are to answer the opening question of 
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this section, however, identifying the domain of imagery is not enough. For instance, 
consider the following snippet from Ernest Hemingway’s novel The Garden of Eden:
The breeze from the sea was blowing through the room and [David] was reading with his 
shoulders and the small of his back against two pillows and another folded behind his head.
  (Hemingway, The Garden of Eden 45)
Suppose a reader of these two lines focuses, as most readers usually do, on the human 
character present on the scene. The reader‑imager may then easily form a referential 
image of David as conjured from within: enacting David’s familiar body posture, 
experiencing the breeze and the pressure of pillows against his back and head, a 
viewing of the pages in David’s book, and perhaps even a glancing at the indistinct 
furnishings of a room. Alternatively, the reader‑imager may form an image of the 
scene as conjured from without: visualizing a sketchy male figure half‑sitting on 
a sofa or bed, a book in his hands, a pillow behind his head. Obviously, these two 
images, albeit equally referential, yield qualitatively very different experiences. One 
puts the reader in David’s position, the other does not. Therefore, it is necessary to 
introduce a second variable, the variable of stance.
Stance in mental imaging can be either inner as in the former image of David 
conjured from within, or outer as in the latter image of David conjured from without. 
That is, although all mental images are necessarily internal to the imager’s body, 
their contents differ in the degree to which the imager’s body is felt to be actively 
at work. The two variables of domain and stance,4 having two instantiations each, 
slice up the field of imagery experiences into four, combining in four possible 
ways into four distinct imagery varieties. Let us now proceed to an overview, and 
to a further characterization, of the four varieties. Let us also keep in mind from 
the very beginning that, even though separated here for the sake of clarity, the four 
varieties are meant to serve as prototypes only, constituting in fact a continuum of 
sorts and thus allowing for quick transitions and in‑between experiences. Consider 
the continued quotation:
The breeze from the sea was blowing through the room [A] and [David] was reading with 
his shoulders and the small of his back against two pillows and another folded behind his 
head [B]. He was sleepy after lunch but he felt hollow with waiting for her and he read 
and waited. Then he heard the door open and [Catherine] came in and for an instant he did 
not know her. She stood there with her hands below her breasts on the cashmere sweater 
and breathing as though she had been running.
 “Oh, no,” she said. “No.”
 Then she was on the bed pushing her head against him saying, “No. No. Please David. 
Don’t you at all?”
 He held her close against his chest and felt it smooth close clipped and coarsely silky 
and she pushed it hard against him again and again.
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 “What did you do, Devil?” [C]
 She raised her head and looked at him and her lips pressed against his and she moved 
them from side to side and moved on the bed so her body was pressed against his. [D]
  (Hemingway, The Garden of Eden 45; my italics)
Briefly, here is what is happening: David and Catherine are on their honeymoon. 
It is the 1920s. Unexpectedly to David, Catherine comes home one day with her 
hair cut short in a new, provocative way.
Depending on the reading situation and the individual reader’s predispositions, 
the passage may prompt the following varieties of imagery.
2.1 Enactment-imagery
Enactment‑imagery is the former of the two varieties exemplified above: it belongs 
to the referential domain, and it is experienced from an inner stance. It amounts to 
vicarious experiencing proper of the referential contents of a given passage. For 
instance, upon the reading of Segment [B] above, a reader imaging in the enactment 
mode may adopt David’s first‑person sensorimotor experience so closely as to feel 
the pressure of a pillow against her neck, or squint imperceptibly in an attempt to 
fixate on the letters in David’s book.
Enactment‑imagery is often the dominant aspiration of modern literary narrative 
with respect to referential imaging, and it is largely considered one of the most 
aesthetically rewarding experiences (e.g. Collins 96). In spite of, or perhaps by virtue 
of, its experiential richness, it is felt to be extremely short‑lived during the very act of 
fluent reading. It is multimodal, often fusing many different sensorimotor modalities, 
external (e.g. the sight of letters on a page) and internal (e.g. the position of one’s 
arms when holding a book, and the muscular tension therein). Whenever such fusion 
takes place, a sense of first‑person presence arises relative to the storyworld.5 For a 
brief moment, then, you are really there, in the shoes of an experiencer, physically 
linked to David’s (imaged) pillows behind your back and his (imaged) book in your 
hand.6 The interaction between the experiencer (and thus also the reader) and the 
imaged environment need not be “literally” physical such as the one between David 
and his book, although such cuing probably adheres most closely to the workings 
of perception as defined within the framework of embodied cognition (e.g. Wilson, 
see also Müller in this volume). Sometimes it is enough that a literary character 
is simply referred to be looking at something, or even just reflecting upon it, for 
the reader to enact the character’s embodied stance vis-à-vis this something. The 
presence of an experiencer (or at least the possibility of inferring one on the part 
of the reader) is, however, a pre‑requisite of enactment‑imagery.
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Enactment‑imagery is felt to occur spontaneously, surprising the imager at 
times, and seemingly without much cognitive effort. It entails a sense of medium 
transparency. In the instant of experiencing enactment‑imagery, the reader‑imager 
comes as close as one possibly can to forgetting that the experience was in fact 
mediated by a string of words on a page. The imager is directly situated with regard 
to the storyworld, experiencing no mediating filter between her embodied mind 
and the referential text contents. With respect to the narrative at large, the image 
in turn is perfectly situated, fitting seamlessly into the surrounding flow of reading 
experience. The last two observations will gain further clarity upon comparison 
with the next imagery variety, description‑imagery.
2.2 Description-imagery
Description‑imagery is the latter of the two varieties exemplified above. It 
belongs to the referential domain, and it is experienced from an outer stance. The 
designation “outer” refers not only to the fact that the internal senses are shut off 
in description‑imagery. It also points to the fact that the imager’s body is situated 
outside the storyworld. Let me restate my above example. My contention that 
David, in Segment [B], can also be imaged from without clearly suggests that even 
though the explicit or inferred presence of an experiencer (in this case, David) is 
a necessary pre‑requisite of enactment‑imagery, it is not a sufficient pre‑requisite. 
That is, experiencers can also be imaged outwardly as objects of description rather 
than only inwardly as subjects of sensorimotor experience proper. This is at the 
core of description‑imagery.
Description‑imagery shares some characteristics of enactment‑imagery in that 
it yields visual images of objects extended in space, but it is not enactive because 
the experience differs in important ways from direct perception. One of the main 
differences is that the verbal medium is not felt to be fully transparent. Rather than 
approaching the stretch of text as someone who is experiencing the contents of 
the mental image directly, the reader thus approaches it as someone who is being 
propositionally informed of an object (or, in this case, a human character) having 
such‑and‑such properties or behaving in such‑and‑such manner. For instance, 
when processing Segment [B] above, the visualization of a sketchy male figure 
reading with a pillow behind his head is then experienced as a compliant response 
to somebody’s (the narrator’s) instructions (see also Scarry 199) to assemble pieces 
of visual information into an image of a male figure reading with a pillow behind his 
head. Therefore, the image is not experienced to have arisen spontaneously, or not 
particularly so. Rather, the reader becomes aware of the cognitive labor invested in 
the imaging process. The pace of reading is felt to have slowed down as the image 
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is being consciously conjured in the reader’s mind. As a consequence, the image 
lacks the experiential richness of enactment‑imagery. 
I have suggested above that enactment‑imagery is effectively cued by references 
to literary characters having sensorimotor experiences, especially when physically 
linked to the environment by way of direct interaction (e.g. by virtue of being 
seated with pillows amassed behind their back, holding a book in their hand). 
What kind of cues, then, would typically prompt description‑imagery? Given the 
sensuous qualities of Hemingway’s prose, especially the introductory reference to 
breeze inviting the reader to form a cutaneous (skin‑based) enactment‑image from 
the outset (Segment [A]), the rendition of David provided in Segment [B] is not a 
very good example. But imagine an alternative version of Hemingway’s passage, 
one in which the pillow behind David’s head is minutely described in several long 
sentences, e.g., as being folded in a particular way and tilted at a particular angle, 
the decorative pattern of the case consisting of minuscule florals of such‑and‑such 
colors forming such‑and‑such complicated ornaments. In this version, the flow 
of narration would be interrupted by a static, thickly descriptive bit. Such are the 
passages that typically prompt description‑imagery, especially when centered around 
isolated inanimate objects (rather than around people or larger spatial configurations; 
see below), which are not easily imaged from within.7
To the extent that a description is noticeable as a pause in narrative, a description‑
image is not always organically situated (in contrast to enactment‑images) with 
respect to the preceding flow of reading experience. It may rather be perceived as a 
semi‑autonomous experience. Nor is the reader‑imager’s body situated with respect 
to the referential contents directly but only through a filter of verbal communication. 
At times, this filter itself becomes the object of the reader’s mental imagery while 
the referential contents of a description (or other text structure) fade away from, 
or simply never enter, the reader’s conscious imagery.8
2.3 Speech-imagery
This is where we are entering the domain of verbal imagery. The first variety to be 
discussed is speech‑imagery. Speech‑imagery is verbal, and it is experienced from 
an outer stance. This means that speech‑imagery yields verbal auditory images with 
only a moderate degree of embodied agency. More specifically, it puts the reader 
in the position of a vicarious listener, someone who is receiving the text as if it 
were spoken out loud by an extraneous speaker. For instance, upon the reading of 
Segment [B], the reader may suddenly feel as though she were hearing the voice of 
an impersonal narrator, telling her about David spending his afternoon with a book, 
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a bunch of pillows behind his back. The reader may even have the impression that 
there was actual pitch, timbre, volume, pace, and so forth to the narrator’s voice.
Again, given the referential suggestiveness of Hemingway’s prose, this variety 
of imagery may not be terribly likely to occur with Segment [B] —, unless the 
reader is specially predisposed—for instance, by a weakness for rhythm or by 
having previously heard the audio edition of the novel (Hemingway, The Garden 
of Eden (Unabridged): Read by Patrick Wilson). Speech‑imagery is, on the other 
hand, quite likely to occur with Segment [C] in the same passage (“What did you 
do, Devil?”). Then of course it is not the bland voice of an impersonal narrator the 
reader images to be hearing but the manly bass (or whatever voice type the reader 
happens to fancy) of a full‑blooded character, David. In typical speech‑imagery 
cues, such as David’s question, a higher degree of orality is detectable compared 
to other instances of literary narrative, including Segment [B].
In speech‑imagery, the verbal medium can never be experienced as fully 
transparent because language, or human speech more specifically, constitutes 
the contents proper of a verbal image. However, speech‑imagery may still seem 
comparably immediate because it comes on quickly, spontaneously, and without 
effort. Therefore, it may also be experienced as relatively robust in terms of 
experience, despite being limited to the auditory modality. Similarly to description‑
imagery, the situation of the reader is a communicative one rather than one of a 
direct (referential) experiencer. Similarly to enactment‑imagery, speech‑imagery is 
short‑lived, as it is perfectly situated with respect to the surrounding flow of narrative 
experience. No lags, delays, or pauses in the flow need to arise for speech‑imagery 
to become fully experienced.
In fact, speech‑imagery marks a degree of situatedness often accompanied by 
referential imagery of the communicative situation. That is, the reader may not only 
hear David utter his question but also see him do it (or alternatively see Catherine, 
David’s interlocutor, or both as engaged in their conversation). However, this 
combinability of speech‑images with various nonverbal images of communicative 
situation does not make such speech‑images referential per se. As long as an 
image represents the sound of a circumscribed verbal structure (“What did you do, 
Devil?”) rather than its nonverbal contents (hard to define as they are in the case of 
a question), it will remain, with regard to that particular structure, a verbal image.
2.4 Rehearsal-imagery
Rehearsal‑imagery, the fourth variety, belongs to the verbal domain, and it is 
experienced from an inner stance. That is, while the voice imaged in speech‑imagery 
belongs to a speaker outside the reader’s body, putting the reader in the position of 
286 Anežka Kuzmičová
a vicarious listener, the voice imaged in rehearsal‑imagery belongs to the reader, 
putting her in the position of a vicarious speaker. The distinctive corporeal feature 
of rehearsal‑imagery vis-à-vis speech‑imagery is that it is consciously felt to deploy 
the reader’s vocal cords and the muscles in her mouth and throat. It is literally inner 
in that it originates in the reader’s articulatory apparatus. Thus rehearsal‑imagery 
is not only auditory; it is also, and necessarily, kinesthetic. There need not be 
much of a voice for one to experience rehearsal‑imagery as long as one feels the 
vibrations. 
Compared to the other three imagery varieties, rehearsal‑imagery may be 
slightly more difficult to predict based on text cues alone. Depending neither on the 
referential imageability of the text contents (as enactment‑ and description‑imagery 
do) nor on the notional presence of a distinct speaker (as speech‑imagery does), 
rehearsal may be allocated much more randomly. Still, in its context, Segment [B] 
may not be the most persuasive example of a sentence to prompt rehearsal‑imagery. 
Segment [D] should work a little better: “She raised her head and looked at him 
and her lips pressed against his and she moved them from side to side and moved 
on the bed so her body was pressed against his.” Rendering in so many words an 
event that intuitively should be referentially quite imageable, this sentence is likely 
to make some readers impatient. Because of its syntax, the sentence is in particular 
need of explicit rhythm and parsing, for both of which it depends on the reader’s 
articulatory apparatus. Readers may thus experience sentences akin to this one by 
way of rehearsal‑imagery.
Similarly to description‑imagery (as compared to enactment‑imagery), the 
embodied experience of rehearsal‑imagery entails significantly more effort as 
compared to speech‑imagery. Reading is felt to lag behind the text as it were because 
this is where the limits of the verbal medium are tried, the reader becoming aware of 
language in its opacity. With the reader’s own vocal apparatus as its medium proper, 
the mental image feels far from spontaneous or immediate. The reader’s experience 
is non‑situated both with respect to the preceding flow of reading overall and with 
respect to the referential contents of the narrative. At the very point of experiencing 
rehearsal‑imagery, the reader imaginatively partakes neither in direct perceptual 
experience nor in communicative speech. The words are being mouthed over for 
her to make sense of them at all. Although weak in terms of auditory perception, 
rehearsal‑imagery is an imagery variety nevertheless. In certain markedly literary 
or poetic types of narrative prose, it may even be the predominant variety.9
Literary Narrative and Mental Imagery: A View from Embodied Cognition 287
Conclusion
My descriptions of the four imagery varieties are summarized in Figure 2. Apart 
from imposing order onto the many distinctive qualities and variables specified 
above, Figure 2 puts additional emphasis on an aspect hitherto undeveloped: the 
four imagery prototypes form a single experiential continuum. What the double‑
headed arrows are meant to show is that the discrete varieties may sometimes be 
experienced to shade off into each other. At least within the two basic domains 
of imagery, the referential and the verbal, such transitions may be experienced as 
relatively smooth. Between domains, they may be more readily perceptible, requiring 
time for a figure/ground reversal from the referential to the verbal or vice versa. In 
addition, the double‑headed arrows remind us that what was described in 2.1 to 2.4 
are precisely just prototypes, and that various kinds of in‑between experiences are 
conceivable, combining the properties of two or several different imagery varieties.
Fig. 2. Imagery continuum
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It would not make much sense to talk about prototypical in‑between phenomena. 
However, let me single out one example of in‑between imagery for each domain. 
Starting with the referential domain, what kind of experiences may be located 
in the midst of the arrow linking enactment‑imagery with description‑imagery? 
I have proposed that enactment‑imagery, amounting to first‑person enactment 
of the embodied stance of a direct experiencer, requires that the presence of 
an experiencer is indeed mentioned, or at least inferred, in the text. I have also 
proposed that description‑imagery, amounting to visualization from the perspective 
of an extraneous spectator, is most reliably prompted by descriptions (detailed) of 
inanimate objects, which are not easily imaged from within.
Then how about descriptions (more or less detailed) of spatial configurations 
such as rooms, buildings, or landscapes? Even though they refer to the inanimate, 
they certainly can be easily imaged from within. To the extent that a description of 
a space seems compelling, the reader can therefore readily adopt the vantage point 
of a direct experiencer‑spectator without necessarily adopting the vantage point of a 
literary character. This is the kind of image one may perhaps form for Hemingway’s 
Segment [A] if read in isolation (“The breeze from the sea was blowing through 
the room”). Technically, this image would be neither an enactment‑image nor a 
description‑image, feeding primarily on the cutaneous sense and only very little 
on the visual. For some, the in‑between experience may even last throughout the 
subsequent Segment [B], the reader becoming a quiet spectator, watching David 
from somewhere in his room. Such outer image would probably only last until 
the first mention, in the subsequent sentence, of David’s inner feelings of being 
sleepy and hollow. That mention locates the perceptual center inside David’s body, 
eliciting enactment‑imagery instead.
In‑between experiences may also occur in the verbal domain. In fact, one such 
experience has been described (or nearly so) in 2.3 above. I am thinking of the 
kind of speech‑imagery (or nearly so) one may experience when mentally imaging 
sentences that can only be attributed to impersonal narrators, e.g., the one informing 
us about David’s quiet afternoon. The voice of such an ontologically indistinct 
narrator who does not make the slightest effort to introduce him‑ or herself as a 
speaker in his or her own right may often sound rather bland, impoverished. More 
precisely, albeit seemingly extraneous to the reader’s body, the only voice imaged 
in this scenario is the reader’s own subvocalizing. This variety of verbal mental 
imaging corresponds neither to speech‑imagery (it is not properly voiced) nor to 
rehearsal‑imagery (first‑person articulatory activity does not reach the reader’s 
consciousness).
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Unlike the referential kind of in‑between imagery prompted by spatial 
description, this verbal kind of in‑between imagery cannot be easily predicted to 
occur with a specific type of text cue. It can only be predicted in a most generic 
way, by saying that it is likely to occur when the narrator is indistinct, refraining 
from commentary and oral residues of the “Dear Reader” family.10 Needless to say, 
narrators of all varieties (and hence any sort of focalization) can be perceived in 
many different ways in the short term, on the level of individual sentences. Here 
again the boundary between what is prototypical and what is in‑between is thin, 
partly because transitions happen in a matter of milliseconds.
Like in the referential domain, moreover, my last example of in‑between 
imagery experience suggests that imageability and image variation largely boil 
down to the degree of perceived figuration (Is there a human body acting/speaking 
in the text?)—i.e., to the amount of embodiment effectively catered to the reader’s 
cognition, or, more precisely, to the reader’s consciousness. It is consciousness, 
not the subpersonal processes of embodied simulation alone, what makes a literary 
narrative slightly different each time we reread it, producing new combinations 
and sequences of mental images. While it must be acknowledged that individuals 
vary in their tendency to experience mental imagery, evidence (for a review, see 
Sadoski and Paivio) suggests that even in the referential domain alone, there are 
few non‑imagers in the absolute. Once readerly imagery is redefined so as to 
overcome referential bias, it is probably fair to say that mental imaging of some 
variety permeates any literary reading experience.
It remains to be studied more closely how the different imagery varieties 
intersect and how these intersections are prompted by textual cues. Perhaps more 
importantly, a whole other line of inquiry needs to be pursued to unravel the ties 
between mental imagery and higher‑order aspects of reading as sociocultural practice. 
Are particular types of interpretive thought facilitated, or even preconditioned, by 
particular varieties of mental imagery? Do avid referential/verbal imagers differ 
from readers less susceptible to such imagery in how they understand narratives 
and how they transfer literary insight into daily life? Does mental imagery, in its 
tendency to recur in memory, intensify the long‑term impact of narrative? Continued 
research into readerly mental imagery will need to address these questions because 
a reader is not only an embodied being responding to sensorimotor stimuli; a reader 
is also a specialized thinker who performs countless ad hoc operations at a time, all 
the while observing socially preconceived interpretive strategies as well as deeply 
personal needs for meaning‑making.11
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Notes
1
 This definition is narrow insofar as it excludes willed mental images (i.e. 
images one has purposely determined to conjure off‑line, while the course of 
reading is interrupted) as well as mental images prompted by indirect association 
(e.g. spontaneously imaging the smell of grandma’s apple pie as a result of reading 
“apple tree”) or sheer mind‑wandering (mental images untraceable to the narrative).
2
 Transportation is a term referring to deep overall involvement in a narrative 
reading experience.
3
 For an exception, see the work of Karen Krasny and Mark Sadoski (“Mental 
Imagery and Affect”), where subjects were asked to rate imagery in general as 
well as describe it freely.
4
 There is also the important variable of sensory modality. Is the image in question 
visual, auditory, olfactory, gustatory, tactile, motor, and so forth or alternatively, 
which of these modalities does it combine? Sensory modality will, however, be 
treated as a dependent rather than independent variable since it combines with the 
previous two variables in partly predetermined ways. For instance, a verbal image 
cannot be olfactory or gustatory. An interesting exception may perhaps be found 
in the experience of synesthetic readers.
5
 For more on enactment‑imagery and presence and their possible textual 
triggers, see my “Presence in the Reading of Literary Narrative.”
6
 Highly transitory in nature, enactment‑imagery does not necessarily entail 
enactment of other aspects of a character’s experience (e.g. emotions). But when 
such further merging between reader and character takes place (see also Caracciolo’s 
“Fictional Consciousnesses”), enactment‑imagery can be a contributing factor.
7
 Readers’ enactment in relation to inanimate or abstract entities has been 
accounted for by Ellen Esrock (“Embodying Literature”). Although closely related, 
the phenomenon described by Esrock falls outside my introductory definition of 
mental imagery in that it requires “reinterpretation,” wherein the reader responds 
to an expression “X” (e.g. “wind”) by experiencing an embodied process Y (e.g. 
attending to her own breathing, thus “becoming” wind) rather than by a more or 
less literal mental image of X, whether cutaneous (feeling wind against her skin) 
or visual (seeing a windy landscape). 
8
 For more on description‑imagery and its basis in descriptive passages, see 
my “Fidelity without Mimesis.”
9
 For more on speech‑imagery and rehearsal‑imagery and their textual 
underpinnings, see my “Outer vs. Inner Reverberations.”
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10
 Alternatively, in‑between verbal imagery may be common in the reading 
of narratives employing strategies such as free indirect discourse and stream of 
consciousness where characters’ utterances are consistently fused with the ones 
attributable to impersonal narrators.
11
 I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer and to the editors of this volume 
for helpful comments on earlier versions of this article.
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